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Exports of feed grains have risen sham-ply in recent years and accounted for 43.7 million tomms or 20 percent of total usage last year. Such exports were up 50 percent from the 1972 level and 150 percent from 1971.
As a consequence of the sharp decline in the quantity of feed grain available and the prospects for large exports again this year, proposals have been made to establish export quotas.
2 Such quotas womsld limit exports to levels below those determined by market forces and increase the quantity of graism available to feed domestic animals. Omme writer argued that time estahlishnmesmt of export quotas "offers the only way ism which the presemmt food amsd feed situation can be fairly dealt witlm. It amommmmts to proteetiomm, 0mm a reasonable basis, of the interests of the Ummited States; tinmely warning to foreigmm clainmants; and the establislmmesmt of fair and equitable access for timenm to a generous share of total U.S. supplies." 5 tm Short tons (2,000 pounds) of com, sorgmim grain, barley, and oats. 
THE SHORT-RUN VIEW
Craism export controls, as implied in the proposed quotas, could serve time mmatiomm with tolerable satisfaction in time slsort run. Suclm actions are simple and direct, ammd timus tend to appeal to masmy people. Direct export controls would have asm early impact on the nlomestie food stmpply. Time nation possesses a given asmmoummt of grain, and the less tlsat is exported, the greater would be tIme asnount available for domnestic use. An increase in tIme quantity available for domestic use would tend to lower domestic grain prices, increase livestock feeding, and increase output of beef, pork, pommitry, milk, asmcl eggs, thus redueimmg food costs. Early results are asstmred in termns of snmalier imscreases imm food costs to niommmestie eomssnsmmmers tlmans would Imave otherwise occurred, and tlmis is the overriding factor to the proponents of export quotas.
Quotas Might Reduce Returns to Producers and Domestic Consumers
The early gains to consunmers in terms of lower food prices is not the whole story, however, even in the short run. A decrease in feed grain exports resulting from time imposition of quotas nmight have an unfavoralmie immmpact on time ismcosnes of graism producers asmd ons time pri.ees of immmports. Givemm a relatively fixed quantity of graio foilowissg Imarvests, chammges in the market price usstii time next harvest year largely reflect changes in desnassd commditiosms ism tIme Ummitecl States ammd abroad. If exports were limited by n 1 mmotas tlme effective demasmd for U. S. grain would he less, and domestic prices would he lower. If the effects of lower dosnestic prices were smot offset by higimer returns frosn exports, gross retmmrsms to graimm imsodtscers wnmuid nleclimme.' m Craimm producer incomes could rise in the slmort rmmmm provided amm expnsrt qnmota system is applied to each pronlmmcer ammd foreigmm de,msaonl for U.S -grain is inelastic -that is, lnmw cost feeni grain substitutes are not available.
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At tIme sammme tinme, the immmpositicsmm of qunmtmms comslnl reduce the vnmiusne of ismmports avnmilanle tnm nlosmmestic commssmmrmers ._A reducti.osm ins time ammmnsummt of graism avail.-able imm xvorlnl markets womsks raise wnmrld grains prices. Depesmding uposs tIme availaimility nmf substitutes, total expesmditures 0mm U. S. grains by fnmreigmm lmuyers miglmt either immcrease or nlecrease.
If relatively low-cost substitutes are available, tlmcnm the umcrease ism graims prices would 1 he relatively somali anmd womsid nmot nmffset time decrease mm tIme qtsammtitysnmld; total expenmditmnres lmy foreigms buyers of U. S. graiss would decline. Asmy such reduction ins total expenditures by foreign purelmasers of U. S. graism would result in a decline in the denmammd for dollars ammd a decrease ism tIme internatiossal value of tlme dollar. This would imply' timat tlme donmmestic price of our inmmports wotmld rise. Commsequemmtly-, the impositiomm of n 1 smotas would increase prices to U. S. cosssunmers of inmported commodities ansd those comnmodities wlmiclm imse imports as issputs to productiomm. Time gaism to U. S. conssunmen~ism terms of reduced food prices coulnl thesm very well be offset by an increase in the prices of other commmnmodities. 1mm this case tlmere is a loss sustaismed by U. S. consumers and grain producers and a gain by producers of other exports.
If low-cost substitutes are not available, lmowever, total expenditures by foreigmm grain purchasers would men-ease. An immerease in total foreign expenditures in time Ummited States would lead to a rise in the exchange rate asmd thus' 'a lowerismg of the dosmmestie price of imports and a rise in the foreign price of U. S. exports. If substitutes are available for our other exports, then U. S. exporters of these goods would incur losses. As a result, donmestie grain producers and domestic grains consumers gaimm at time expesmse of other U. S. exporters and fnmreigmm cosmsunmers.
i'Immss, eosmsumers ins time Ummited States womsld stasmd to gain mm the short runm frommm tIme cosmtrols omsly if demand for grain in the world market were inelasticthat is, if few grains substitutes were available anmd time reduced quasmtity of graism were sold to foreignm purchasers for nmore dollars.
Another consideration in the imposition of quotas is that they might induce retaliation. Suppose, for example, that oil-producing nations decided to retaliate by imposing quotas on timeir oil exports to the United States. This would raise the domestic price of oil, and again, U. S. consumers could be worse off than before.
The above analysis indicates that in the sisort run the net effect of the quotas could be a decrease in the quasmtitv of innports anmd asm ismcrease mm the quasmtity of grain available to consumers in the United States. One should he reminded, however, that if feed grains were more valuable to domestic consumers than the imports, the market itself would guarantee timat no grains would he exported. In other words, if domestic consunmers were willing to pay more for graism tlmasm for products from abroad, grain producers would be able to sell their grain for lmighcr returns ins the United States than in the won-id market. In this context, instead of purportedly increasing consumer well-being, tIme imposition of export quotas, evesm for a period of one year, would actually decrease well-being.
THE LONG-RUN IMPACT
In contrast to the possibility of some slmort-run gains to domestic consumers from grain export quotas, over the longer run such quotas would he harmful to both domestic and foreign consumers. Given time for retaliatory policies and resource adjustments, export quotas on grain wommld, in time long run, tend to: (1) reduce grain exports; (2) reduce domestic grain production; (3) decrease dosnestic farnm inconmes; (4) reduce the overall qmnasmtity of goods and services produced, therehy lowerismg the well-being of commsumers in the United States asmd time rest of the world; and (5) cause further increases ins domestic prices.
Reduces Grain Er-ports
In addition to their immediate isnpacts, export quotas wlsich limit time quantity of grain exported in the ctmrremmt year xvould tesmni to reduce the valmne of future grain exports. For example, if the United States permits grain importing nations free access to nmnr grain markets only during years when production is equal to or above the trend level, this nation would cease to be a dependable source of grain supplies. Consequerntly, those nations wlmicls have heretofore depended on the United States for a portion of their grain would likely take action to assure a relatively stable supply, rather than depend on U. S. imports on an intermittent basis. Food consunmption habits develop over a period of years and do not change readily for the convenience of such on and off trade.
Grain importimsg nations could provide for alternative sources of grains supplies in several different ways. They d'ould ismcnease their owmm produetiomm imm the loimg run because of the increase in the cost and unreliability of U. S. grain. They might also negotiate bilateral trade agreements with other grain producing nations for a greater portion of their grain supply. Such agreements might be accompanied by protective
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tariffs and import restrictions applied during the years that this nation had larger than average supplies, or had surpluses if price supports were used to prevent price declines. Either of tine above moutes to a more dependable source would ultimately result in less U. S. grain exports and a con-espondi ng reduction in imports of foreign goods and services.
Reduces U.S. Grain Production
If the quotas were at all effective, they would result in lower domestic grain prices and, therefore, in decreased production. Since farmers operate under competitive conditions, they produce at the level where the estimated cost of producing the last unit of outpnt is equal to the projected price. Production of additional units entails higlser per unit costs of productions, ansd a decrease in price caused by export quotas implies tlsat some of the output is being produced at a loss unless the producer anticipated the lower pnces at the time of planting. Consequently, each farmer would reduce production and total grain output would decline.
From the donsestie consumers' point of view, such a decline in production is not objectionable. He would get a somewhat larger quantity of grain at a marginally lower price tisan otlserxvise. Hence, time direct burden of reduced. U. S. grain outpnst would be borne by foreign consumers svho receive less grain at higher prices and domestic grain producers who would incur capital losses as resous-ces were transferred from the production of grains to time production of other products. But, as will be seen later, there are secondary effects which would work towards reducing the wellbeing of U. S. consumers.
Another factor wisicln tends to reduce production under a quota regime is time greater price risks taken by producers. Under export controls time price signals received by producers reflect not only world supply and demand consditions hut also the uncertainty witln respect to time restrictiosms. Tine political forces which determined the controls would he tine result of connpromises hetween feed grain producers, feed users, and consumer groups. The result of such compromises and their impact on prices is difficult to predict. Hence, producers and farm credit suppliers would have to snake allowance for these additional risks in their production and lending plans.
Reduces Farm Incomes
Famsn incomes wouinl he less under export quotas tlsans with free tranle. The lower prices per usmit reeeivcnl for grains conmslmissn'nl with ns reductions ins graism onttptmt would~mrolmaImly resnnlt ins a sizable nieclinme ins gross sales. Consequesmtin-, inmcnmnmes to grains prodtmcers assd retursms tnm timeir resonnrces would decline.
Reduces Well-Being for U.S. and World Consumers
In the discussion of the short-run effects of the impositions of grain export quotas, time possibility of a declisse in time well-being of U.S. consumers was discussed. Time possibility exists because of a potential increase ins tine prices nsf imports. In time long run, insteanl of just time possibility of a loss, tine loss becomes a certainty. If quoto.s were effective, grain productions and grains exports mvoulnl decline, Ins the short run, domestic consumer gains or losses would depend 0mm wlsetlser foreignmers could finmd substitutes for our grain. In tIne lossg run, ssmbstitutes are always available and tine quotas would restsit inn trade losses.
Tine losses occur because in time long run our foreign currency earnings wos.nld decline and we would he able to bmny less foreign products, sucln as oil, sugar, coffee, and raw nnaterials for the nsansmfaeture of steel and alumismmnm. Again, osse could make an argument that a decline in the domestic price of grain would offset the increase in the price of oil amsd other imported products, and tlmat domestic consunners would ime as well off witss tlse expnsrt qnnotas as prior to tlmeir insmposition. This reasoning, Imonvever, connpietely overlooks time source of the foreigss trade gains. WIny, for example, was the United States producing wheat in tine first place and exclnammging it for oil rather than producing all of the oil that the nation consumed? The simple answer is that by producing wheat and trading it for oil we gained wealth. That is, the process used up less of our resources than if we had taken resources used in the productinmn of wheat and used them to increase the production of oil. Through trade we have obtained more oil and more wheat tinan we could acquire by attempting to become self sufficient in the production of botim wheat and oil. This is time fundamenstal reasons for all specialization asmnl for all trade, donsmestic ansd inmternmationnal. lmndividuals, as well as countries, have different natural and technnologieal enndomvumemmts, nmnmd Imy specializinmg inn tine production of some goods and services and exchanging tlnens fnmr otlmers, they cams inmcreasc tine tnmtal amssonnnmt of all products that are available for consumption.
Despite the artificial quadruphng of oil prices by time oil producers' cartel, it may still be cheaper to cx-
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change grain for oil than to produce additional quantities of oil domestically. An imposition of quotas would shift our resources frons the production of grain to the production of oil and we would tlmus forego the savings accrued from exchange. Tine opposite shift wotnld take place in foreign counmtries. As a result, all eosssumers, botin donmsestic ammd foreignm, would be worse off. Thus, what appears to nsany people as a reduction in food prices and an increase in the welfare of U. S. consumers from time establishment of grain export quotas, actually becomes a net loss. This country has opposed the imposition of artificial restrictions on oil output by the oil-producing countries, It is argued that such restrictions could cause a worldwide decline in the standard of living. Yet, some analysts are proposing that the United States practice the same tactics and the same consequences would likely be in prospect.
Increases Domestic Prices
Grain export controls over the long run would tend to cause tine domestic price level to be higher than would have prevailed without the controls. To the extent that the controls reduced international speciaJization of production and exchange of goods, they would reduce the total quantity of goods available to consumers in both the United States and foreign coumntries. This reduction in supply, assuming no offsetting change in the rate of monetary growth, would cause higher prices. Thus, instead of contributing to a lower rate of inflation, as contended by some of the proponents, export controls would actually cause further price increases.
CONCLUDING SUMMARY
The quantity of feed grain available for domestic use plus exports is dosvns this year from the level of a year ago. The decline will tend to reduce livestock feeding and cause higher food prices. Proposals have been made to limit feed grain exports througln export quotas to avoid the upward pressure on food prices from the reduced grain supplies. This proposed solution is simple and direct, and may appeal to many people. However, such quotas could actually reduce the economic well-being of the nations iss time slnort run and would certainly renluee well-being over a longer period.
In the short run domestic food prices would be lower witlm the quotas tlsanm witlnotnt thenss. I-lowever, depemnclmg oss whetlser or snot tlsere are substitutes for U. S. grains in foreignm nmarkets, the prices of U. S. imports could rise sigmnifieantly. As a result, U. S. consumers could enmd up with more grain and fewer inmports thasm they would lnave in a free exchanmge systesu. In smmclm a situatiosn, both timis snatiosm anmd grain importinng nnationms would lose as a result of the quotas. Ins additions, the qtnotas snight trigger sonmse han-ssmful retaliatory measures by fnmreigns nsatiosms, such as tine aetiosms of tine oil cartel last year.
Over the longer run, export quotas would be even more damaging than in the slnort run. In the long run tlmey inmlnihit donmestie grains production annl reduce donssestic farnms ineonsnes. Bsnt of greater insportasmce, tlmev reduce the long-rums gainms fronn inmternmationsal specializations, tlmerehy greatly redueisng the overall nmutpnnt of goods anmd services, the ss'ell-heinng of conssummmers, anmd cansse ftnrther price inmcreases mm hotls tlsis nation and abroad.
